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I Definition of Welfare
Welfare can be defined as the conditions that
enable people to live a happy life or to fare well'.
These conditions change over time. For a long
time, the idea that welfare was equal to charity,
relief and alms occupied a dominant position.
Subsequently, theories of equality and the practice
of universal suffrage within civil society began to
give welfare the content of equal rights. Unlike
human rights, these rights are socially determined
and have been interpreted in different ways in dif-
ferent countries and at different times. In the post-
World War II period, institutional social security
prevailed throughout western Europe. Welfare
states, marked by massive government spending
for the purpose of enhancing social equality,
boomed until the early 1980s when Mrs Thatcher's
government started to severely cut welfare spend-
ing in Britain, since when they have been in
decline. In recent years, the concept of equal social
rights has increasingly been interpreted as 'the right
to equal opportunities', as opposed to the concept
of 'the right to equal distribution'. Since 'Third
Way' politicians have assumed office in some
European Union member states, the word 'welfare'
has been overshadowed by the call for 'work-fare'.
As some welfare programmes in the field of educa-
tion and health have proved useful for human
resource development, and are believed to be
instrumental for bringing out human potential,
greater emphasis has been placed on education and
health rather than on institutional programmes of
distribution. Welfare spending has started to move
from institutional redistribution to either means-
tested relief or social investment in a variety of ser-
vices aiming at human development. These are
referred to as 'positive welfare' by Third 1vVay politi-
cians and theoreticians.'
The composition of welfare programmes varies in
different countries, mainly because in conditions of
scarce resources people in specific countries and
contexts have to decide on the composition of wel-
fare programmes which can best meet their needs.
This decision will be greatly influenced by the
political situation in a country as once described
by Rimlinger (1971). The demand for preserving
and improving human life, for example, can be
understood both as the demand for having enough
food and clothing and as that for controlling, using
and protecting natural resources on which human
beings rely for existence. Suppliers of welfare can-
not resist the influences of their times (including
natural, economic, social and polïtical specificities)
in their policy-making, and welfare provisions in
the twentieth century have been strongly deter-
mined by national governments.
Emile Durkheim predicted the adverse effects of
government intervention in welfare provision. He
asserted that social welfare accomplished through
governmental policies could not bring happiness to
people since the structural changes of a society
which would result from social welfare interven-
tions would weaken traditional enterprise associa-
tions and violate the social contract and market
ethic (Durkheim 1964: 11). Herbert Spencer made
a similar point. He opposed the institutionalisation
of welfare provision into a relationship of overall
responsibility (Spencer 1894), believing that a new
form of social integration would appear as social
structures became more complex and diverse.
However, such integration should not be a mode of
collective subsistence because 'socialist' subsistence
would restrain individual freedom, making the
poor believe that their misery was the only reason
for receiving support and holding contributors
responsible for this (Spencer 1969: 82). The social
integration that Spencer predicted did not become
a reality. On the contrary; the welfare state as a
model of social responsibility developed rapidly in
western Europe after World War Il.
Expositions of welfare states are numerous. Many
scholars emphasise the relationship between indus-
trialisation and the development of welfare states,
regarding the welfare state as the inevitable out-
come of industrialisation in contemporary western
countries. The welfare state has been regarded as a
comprehensive and massive regulator of contempo-
rary western industrialised societies, in which gov-
ernments can guarantee all citizens a basic standard
of income, nutrition, health care, housing, and
employment opportunities, in the form of rights
rather than as charity (Wilensky and Lebeaux
1965).
According to some analysts, the welfare state in
industrialised countries is a supplement to the cap-
italist market economy and serves to weaken the
role of trade unions (Swenson 1991: 379-99). To
others, it is a result of long political struggles by the
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working class, and therefore depends on the bal-
ance of class forces, on the politics of political par-
ties and even on the 'game rules' of political
struggles (Kropi 1983). Still others believe that the
role of capital is often underestimated, and it is the
capital and structural function of business circles,
combined with the fluctuations caused by special
institutional arrangements and deep-seated changes
in economic structures, that has produced the cur-
rent social responsibility systems among individu-
als, market and countries (Pierson 1992). The
welfare state has also come under severe attack.
Max vVeber criticised social welfare policies for
being bureaucratised because they are partially
imposed on the government by interest groups, or
the government itself usurps them to serve either
power politics or ideology (Gerth and Wright Mills
1961: 213). Herbert Marcuse attacked the welfare
state for making labourers 'the slaves of the indus-
trialised civilisation' (Marcuse 1966: 32-33).
Fromm argued that men's original inclination is a
kind of instinct for 'self-strengthening', and that
people can use such inclination to create their own
social interdependence (Fromm 1971: 47-48,
289-90).
It would be mistaken, however, to apply the above
arguments directly to the evaluation of a concrete
welfare system. Instead, we need to look at different
types or models of welfare provision before any
conclusion can be drawn.
2 Types of Welfare
Western scholars have frequently attempted to
make classifications of welfare systems. One widely
used classification is to divide welfare into 'institu-
tional' and 'residual' models. The institutional
model is typically represented by social security sys-
tems in continental Europe, while residual pro-
grammes concentrate on dealing with specific cases.
According to Robert Pinker
The residual model of social welfare is closely
linked to 'optimistic' theories of economic
growth, ... It is argued that 'with increasing and
more diversified prosperity; the incidence of
such problems as poverty is declining. The aim
of social welfare under these circumstances
should be to focus selectively upon a residual
and declining minority of needy groups. In
this way, scarce resources will be used more
efficiently and, in appropriate cases, provided at
a level sufficiently generous to bring about a
marked improvement in social circumstances.'
(Pinker 1971: 99)
On the contrary
The 'institutional' model of social welfare is
closely related to differing interpretations of the
effects of economic growth, ... The effect of
industrialization is so to heighten the risks and
consequences of contingencies like unemploy-
ment, poverty, illiteracy disease and homeless-
ness, that these services must be provided on a
universal basis. (Pinker 1971: 99-100)
Prior to Pinker, Richard Titmuss tried to create a
typology of social welfare. He looked at the 'private
market' for services of 'free choice', in addition to
universal social services and governmental financial
provisions (such as tax reduction or remission).
However, he denied the social functions of occupa-
tional benefits and welfare markets on the grounds
of social justice (Titmuss 1968: 138-152). Harold
Wilensky also presented a classification of welfare.
He recognised the different functions of both insti-
tutional and residual models and observed that
Americans preferred the residual model of limited
government intervention while Europeans were
more inclined to the universal institutional model
and comprehensive government intervention
(Wilensky and Lebeaux 1965: 138-40),
To sum up the above discussion, at least three mod-
els of service provision can be identified:
The residual model of welfare, which aims to pro-
vide basic services for the least privileged, and
begins to be effective when the functions of mar-
ket and family crumble.
The institutional model of welfare, known as social
security aims at combating market failure and
provides universal services based on needs,
rights and social justice.
The third kind of provision is now beginning to
be noticed as a supplement to the public pro-
grammes of institutional and residual models.
Forty years after Titmuss denied occupational
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benefits on the ground of social justice, Esping-
Andersen acknowledged 'defined contribution
plans' as an alternative to public pensions
(Esping-Andersen 1996: 26).
Both residual and institutional models of welfare
involve government intervention, while the occupa-
tionaldefined contribution model does not.
2.1 Types of welfare in China
The concepts of these three models are all useful in
understanding the situation in China, with the lat-
ter causing most confusion. Since Chinese enter-
prises are still by and large state owned, a
distinction between programmes run by firms and
those run by the state proves difficult in many cases.
For example, the Ministry of Labour and Social
Security took upon itself the responsibility to issue
documents on the 'Enterprise Supplementary
Pension Programmes'. Enterprises and government
agencies manage individual accounts directly.2
Indeed, occupational benefits are referred to as 'wel-
fare' in China and many Chinese view occupational
benefits as public provision.
lt is therefore important in China to distinguish not
only the residual model of welfare from the institu-
tional model of welfare, but also the occupational
benefits, which came to be known as 'work unit
welfare', from public welfare programmes. In the-
ory the two models are very different. The ultimate
goal of occupational benefits is for firms to become
more competitive by investing in human resource
development, while the purpose of social welfare is
to reduce social inequality and eliminate social
injustice by institutïonal redistribution or by invest-
ing in human development. One aims at improving
society the other at maximising profit.
It is not necessarily wrong to provide services aimed
at increasing capital, if the services benefit some
and do not harm others. Experience shows that
some of the bigger firms, in order to secure a qual-
ity labour force, can behave 'compassionately' or
'benevolently', contributing not oniy to better skills,
bigger pensions, safer homes, but also to local edu-
cation, development and welfare (Wellingham and
Cohn 1987: 5-10). Recent studies show how some
multinational firms, through the development of
codes of conduct within their industry around the
globe, are benefiting their employees across country
borders (Snyder 1999). This raises the question of
whether greater occupational provision can reduce
the demand for public provisions and contribute to
the overall well-being of humankind.
3 Significance of Decomposing
Welfare through Comparison
Decomposing welfare provisions into different
functional units provides a structure for us to
understand the composition of social responsibility
systems in different countries. For example, com-
pared with British and American public social secu-
rity programmes, we see that Germany ranks at the
top in terms of the extension of coverage. In
Germany, the institutional model covers contingen-
cies for old age, disease and industrial injury All the
programmes are defined-benefit social insurance,
and eligibility is based on employment and the pay-
ment of a fairly high social insurance tax. Social
insurance institutions are the main administrative
organisations, with the Ministry of Labour and
Social Affairs working as a surveillant. The advan-
tages of this model may be found in the universal
standards of contribution and benefits, relative sta-
bility of the system and better protection of the ben-
eficiaries. Relevantly, it is more difficult to reform
the system (US Department of Health and Human
Services 1983 and 1991).
By contrast, the eligibility for social security protec-
tion in Britain is habitation and taxation. The old
age and public health programmes cover all resi-
dents at a certain level. Thus, the relevant British
government branches take more responsibilities for
administering the programmes than their counter-
parts in Germany There is an obvious tendency for
the government in such a system to level off the
benefits, and to shift from institutional provision
back to traditional residual provision. In this case, it
is easier to implement reform programmes and
lower the standard of public benefits in Britain.
Another reason for a more flexible public social
welfare system in Britain rests on the fact that the
tradition of providing additional company pen-
sions, although declining since the heyday of the
welfare state, has never died out. As public social
security benefits were cut, private pensions started
to rise (US Department of Health and Human
Services 1983 and 1991).
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The United States is known for its three-pillar sys-
tem. The government limits its role in social protec-
tion, and most programmes have set ceilings for
benefits. For example, the practices in health care
provisions are diverse, and the residual model of
governmental programmes only covers the retirees
who have paid their social security taxes and the
poor. It is obvious that the American system leaves
many responsibilities to the market and other pri-
vate sources of which occupational benefits account
for approximately one-third (US Department of
Health and Human Services 1983 and 1991).
To further our comparison to non-western countries,
we can draw several conclusions. First, modern
industrial societies have reached a consensus on what
should be considered as basic human needs to be
protected with public resources. It is the responsibil-
ity of governments and societies all over the world to
provide social assistance to the poor and needy
Industrial injuries are considered as a social respon-
sibility here since the government plays a mandatory
role in regulating this insurance. All the listed coun-
tries and regions in Table 1 provide industrial injury
insurance, which should be seen as a commonality of
industrial societies. With regard to medical coverage,
practices are widely divergent. In Britain, the public
health scheme covers all residents, while in the
United States, only the aged and poor are eligible for
public coverage. Neither of the two has chosen insti-
tutional redistribution as the form for health insur-
ance. In western industrial societies, old age
protection is to a greater or lesser degree a state/social
responsibility and the institutionalised public pen-
sion programmes are by and large defined-benefit
and pay-as-you-go in nature. These programmes dif-
fer from each other by wage replacement rates, but
are sharply distinguished from the defined-contribu-
tion programmes in Hong Kong and Singapore.
Secondly, the comparison of these programmes
inspired thinking over the reasons for different
choices of welfare policies. The level of industriali-
sation proves not to be the sole reason for the com-
position of welfare programmes, since the most
developed industrial country, the United States, has
the narrowest public coverage among the western
economies. Another example may be found in the
comparison with Hong Kong and Singapore. Both
places have a history of British rule, yet both have
developed their unique compositions of welfare
Table 1: Comparison of social security systems and their responsibilities
programmes different from that of Britain. They
resembled Britain in providing public medical ser-
vices for natural, geographical and historical rea-
sons,3 while remaining distinct in not choosing
universal unemployment insurance and pension
insurance for social protection. Instead, both Hong
Kong and Singapore carried out large-scale public
housing programmes benefiting roughly 40 per
cent of the residents, a service which is seldom pro-
vided in the western industrial countries. Hong
Kong enjoys a relatively high rate of employment
and a high rate of labour turnover. Of its six million
population, many come from mainland China and
will leave Hong Kong when they retire. For this
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particular labour force on a land of high density,
housing became the most urgent need to which the
government found ways to respond. l-long Kong's
remarkable low-rent public housing scheme was
formulated in the early 1950s. The intrinsic logic of
introducing this programme is consistent with that
of industrial injury and old age insurance in the
West. Such analyses suggest that the discussions in
China on the 'completion of the welfare state' are
untenable and that simple analogy and direct imita-
tion are obsolete. lt is time to look at actual condi-
tions, such as population and economic structure,
natural environment, etc. to identify the contingen-
cies to which a response is needed.
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Another conclusion to be drawn from the above
discussion is that social welfare provision from pub-
lic sources does not have to be comprehensive.
Table 1 shows clearly the existence of other chan-
nels, including enterprises, organisations, families
and individuals, which jointly provide services not
provided for from public sources. The benefits pro-
vided by enterprises may be business-oriented or
mutual aid in nature, the individual account purely
personal savings; they can be regulated to meet
human needs, and can also serve as pillars of social
protection. In this case, human needs are not only
provided for by social security and social welfare
programmes, but by all three pillars, namely social
and public provision, occupational benefits and pri-
vate sources from individuals and families (Bargo
1994).
Countries choose different compositions of the
three pillars: some have a stronger social security
pillar, such as Germany; others put more emphasis
on employer or individual contributions, such as
the United States, or a regulated individual role,
such as Singapore. These international experiences
provide useful lessons for China in the transition
from a condition that is characterised as 'public not
public, private not private'4 to a diversified univer-
sal social protection system. The rationale of keep-
ing country-specific balances between institutional
social security and residual social assistance are very
relevant in China for the division of labour between
the Ministry of Labour and Social Security and the
Ministry of Civil Affairs. Firms and employers in
China should also provide supplementary annuity
programmes as a part of their incentive systems. A
more comfortable life after retirement can be con-
sidered as the responsibility of families and individ-
uals in China too. Charitable organisations could
provide mutual aid programmes in replenishing the
whole system. Organisation for Economic Co-oper-
ation and Development (OECD) research shows
that people aged 55 and older in Australia collect
36.11 per cent of their income from public pen-
sions (1981); this number is 32.63 in Canada
(1981), 41.84 in Netherlands (1983), 34.71 in
Switzerland (1982), 41.69 in Britain (1979), 54.14
in Germany (1981), and only 29.78 in the US
(1979) (OECD 1992: 46). Following the social
security reforms in continental European countries,
the above rates will decline. With the dual system of
social security separating the urban workers from
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rural, China has been able to secure a fairly high
wage replacement rate for urban retirees.5 Should
China move to a universal public pension pro-
gramme, then given the size of the country and the
population, it is unrealistic for China to offer a
replacement rate higher than that of European
countries. The solution can only be found from sec-
tors other than the public.
Experience in other countries or areas tells us that
some of the social responsibilities are movable
between institutional and residual models, and also
between public and private sectors. The reduction
in unemployment benefits parallels the rise of
spending on job training and other services.
Pension income can come from many sources. The
crux is to find the right programmes for the right
conditions, as Hong Kong has done with its hous-
ing programme. It would be completely irrelevant
to take the European welfare models, or American,
Japanese, or Latin American models as the criteria
for China. Each society has its own natural envi-
ronment and political, economic, social, cultural
and historical background, thus the basic needs of
people and the resource components are bound to
be different. If Americans had imitated the
Singapore or Hong Kong housing programmes,
developed for city-states, they would have been
doomed to failure.
Moreover, welfare programmes are designed to fit
within different boundaries. In an agricultural soci-
ety, the protective measures for labourers are lim-
ited within their narrow scope of activities in the
form of services in kind. Life insurance was
invented in Italy to protect sailors who were
exposed to different contingencies from those at
home. National social security is indeed the inven-
tion of industrialised societies in which labourers
are able to move for jobs within national borders.
Again, firms provide occupational welfare only to
their employees and employment is seen as the
boundary, of eligibility for the benefits. Different
welfare and protection schemes follow different
people. Since people have different needs, the com-
position of welfare in a country has to be made up
of diversified programmes which combine into a
coherent whole. Therefore, it is very important to
study the contingencies of Chinese people before
designing welfare programmes for them. The classi-
fication and the delimitation of welfare, as we have
done in this article, evokes learning about the limi-
tations of contemporary welfare systems. Of course,
the frontiers of welfare states are also challenged by
the trend of globalisation. Globalisation is accom-
panied by the growth of private pensions and other
occupational benefits. On the other hand, as
Esping-Andersen has pointed out, European wel-
fare states have failed to make changes as social and
family structures have changed. The institutional
model marked by high taxation and high benefits is
conducive to late entry and early exit, which causes
the shrinking and decline of the system (Esping-
Andersen 1996: 18-20). Britain, for example, has
seen the decline of the institutional model and the
expansion of social assistance in the last decade.
Social security must be subject to change, as
Munnell once wrote, following changes in eco-
nomic, societal and administrative institutions, if it
is to be successful (Munnell 1977: 11).
Needless to say, the recomposition of welfare sys-
tems does not always prove to be rational. In addi-
tion to many objective factors, the politics of a
country tends to play a very important role. In
western European countries we have to understand
party politics in order to explain social welfare
reforms. In China, the politics between government
agencies also play a role in the direction of welfare
reforms. This fact does not diminish the usefulness
of decomposing welfare; instead, decomposing wel-
fare into different types and models is instrumental
for the understanding of different limits and ratio-
nales of welfare provision.
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Notes
For those arguments, see for example Giddens
(1999) and related works and The Joint Manifesto by
Blair and Schoeder, Europe: The Third Way/The New
Middle Wing.
References may be found in numerous publications
in China, for example see the journal of China Social
Insurance, 1998. A recent survey on the opinions of
Chinese social security Experts shows that only 63.3
per cent of them believe that the individual account
should be separated from social insurance
management. See 'Experts' opinions - a survey',
journal of China Social Security, March 2000.
As the early Bntish colonialist army suffered severely
from the humid climate and epidemic pestilence in
Hong Kong and Singapore, the British government
introduced a public medical system.
An official from the Ministry of Labour and Social
Security told the author that in Shanghai, the
experimental city for social security reform, a public
pension scheme is managed by the local Labour
Office, additional occupational pension programmes
are also managed by the local Labour Office, and the
so-called 'individual accounts' again are managed by
the enterprises in collaboration with the local Labour
Office. There have been cases reported in the
television news that some local Labour Offices have
used money towards constructing their residence
buildings.
The current plan is to aim at a 75 per cent
replacement rate.
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